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edented degree. Neither pessimism nor optimism can be validated given existing levels of
knowledge, making the pursuit of the vision
that corresponds to our values the most sensible course of action. And who is to say that its
realization is less likely than the emancipation
of Eastern Europe seemed a decade ago?!
Richard Falk
Princeton University

The Law of Humanity and the
Law of Nations
The nineteenth-century doctrines known as
"international law" developed out of the seventeenth-century "jus gentiun" and eighteenth-century "law of nations." Now we see
that twentieth-century scholars such as Richard Falk would like to speak of the "law of
humanity". What is the value of such semantic
shifts? Proponents of "international law"
sought to promote a positivist doctrine, which
would minimize the natural law elements of
the old law of nations to privilege the views of
governments and states. Advocates of the"law
of humanity" presumably seek to diminish the
role of states in international law by eliminating "nations" as the basis of world institutions.
I will argue that this would be a profound
mistake, which confuses the purposes of law,
nations, peoples and the state.
I. The Law of Nature
Early scholars of the law of nations such as
Grotius, Pufendorf and Vattel applied the law
of nature to nations to discover public obligations and rights among peoples. They began
with the assumption that all persons are naturally free and equal. Free and equal persons
properly relinquish certain rights and powers
to states or nations in the interests of justice
and the common good of all citizens. But nations, on this theory, remain in a state of nature
with regard to each other. Without a legislaASIL •

ture to define common justice they must look
directly to natural law. So the best evidence of
natural law is the general agreement of humanity, as reflected in the opinions and practices of all nations.
Notice that this made the law of nations in
a sense a "law of humanity" from the very
beginning. Early proponents of thejusgentium
considered the best evidence of the law of
nature and of nations to be human consensus,
as reflected primarily through the laws and
governments of states, acting on the international stage. But this reasoning contained two
central fallacies. First, not all nations are states,
at least in the original sense of the term. "Nation" implies common birth and first referred
to prepolitical divisions within and around the
(international) Roman empire. Nations can
exist without political autonomy. Second, not
all states speak for nations. Nearly all governments in Vattel's time were self-interested tyrannies. Grotius and Pufendorf suffered
pointless persecution by the most enlightened
rulers of Europe. The voice or consensus of
humanity is not always best or most clearly
expressed by the governments of the day.
This observation must be the basis of the
claims for "civil society" advanced by proponents of the "law of humanity". Governments
will not always seek justice and the common
good. Governmental interests may diverge
from those of the people. Governments often
oppress the people, or disagree amongst themselves. "Civil society" offers an alternative
source of authority. To accept with Grotius
and Vattel that the best expression of international law is the deliberate voice of humanity
still leaves the very difficult problem of where
that voice may be heard.
II. Interstate Law
Critics of the existing world order stigmatize international law as mere "interstate law"
among consenting tyrants. They have a point.
During the nineteenth century positivist followers of Jeremy Bentham and John Austin
denied the very idea of a "natural law", dis-
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cernible in the law of nations, as "nonsense on
stilts". They coined the phrase "international
law" to reflect their view that law among nations exists (to the extent that it exists at all)
only between nations, when nations agree
upon firm laws by treaty or other positive act.
This view gained legitimacy from Vattel's old
conception of states as free and equal actors,
able to proceed without external restraint in
their own internal affairs, just as free individuals or citizens properly act without restraint
in their own personal ("private") affairs. Liberals embraced a theory that protected each
"nation" against outside interference by the
others.
Here again, as in the old "law of nations,"
the positivists' new "international law" lost
moral force to the extent that it relied on selfserving, tyrannical governments. Some positivists freely admitted the moral vacancy of
law as they conceived it. Austin, for example,
and latterly Hart claimed to gain in clarity
what they lost in justice. To make law clear by
limiting its sources means that there Will be
less law - no international law at all, according to Austin. But perhaps clarity prevents
quarrels. There is a certain intuitive appeal to
the claim that each "nation" should pursue
self-determination without foreign interference in its own internal affairs.
The Charter of the United Nations reflects
the mixed origins of international law (and the
analogy between states and free persons)
when it echoes the United States Declaration
of Independence in declaring that "We the
Peoples of the United Nations" propose to (1)
maintain international peace and security; (2)
respect the equal rights and self-determination
of peoples; (3) encourage respect for human
rights; and (4) harmonize the actions of nations
to achieve these common ends. The actors here
are "nations", but also self-determining states,
committed to universal human rights. This
commitment to rights (and its basis in nations)
was reaffirmed in 1948 by the United Nations
General Assembly's Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.
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III. Human Rights
Proponents of the "law of humanity" attribute its origins and early history to the international law of human rights. Certainly
human rights have always put limits on the
sovereignty of states. Even so great an advocate of absolute government as Jean Bodin admitted in his chapters on sovereignty that
foreign states may intervene to protect oppressed peoples against despots. So it was
nothing new, after the Second World War,
when the United States imposed the concept of
individual human rights onto post-war international instruments. But this tended to undermine the more extreme state-centered theories
of international law. Why defer to unelected
governments in determining the content of the
rights of humanity?
The concept of rights grew up and flourished in tandem with the popular sovereignty.
The earliest rights claimed in the modern
world were political rights. First, peoples
sought national self-determination against
German or Spanish overlords, as in Switzerland and the Netherlands; then citizens sought
internal self-determination against local monarchs, as in the English Commonwealth and
Glorious Revolution; finally, developed the
full and self-conscious union of popular sovereignty with determinate limits on government,
in the United States Constitution. Political
rights and protections guaranteed the integrity
of public deliberation, which yielded as law
the best available approximation of justice and
the common good.
The collapse of the French revolution into
Bonaparte's empire tended to discredit popular sovereignty in Europe. This led to Benjamin
Constant's famous (false) distinction between
the liberty of the moderns and the liberty of the
ancients. Modern Europeans inevitably abuse
political freedom, Constant argued, but still
deserve personal liberty in their private affairs.
So public and private liberty became separated, "liberalism" was born, and with it the
question of how "liberty" and "justice" will be
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defined, in the absence of a valid democratic
technique for discovering the deliberate consensus of the people.

self-determination, in the context of nationstates.
V. Republicanism

IV. Civil Society
Some now offer "civil society" as the new
authority for a "law of humanity". There exists
no clear definition of what this might mean,
but "civil society" seems to imply (to those
who embrace it) an energized citizenry of the
world, acting outside of normal governmental
channels, to express the deliberate consensus
of the people, while treating, as Richard Falk
puts it, "each person on earth a sacred subject".
Falk situates this general will in transnational
non-governmental institutions such as Amnesty International, or internal social movements such as Solidarity in Poland, or Charter
77 in the former Czechoslovakia.
If the "law of humanity" is to mean a "law
that is enacted by and for the peoples of the
world" it cannot rest on such self-appointed
tribunals as these, or the regional Watch
groups, or Lelio Basso's Permanent Peoples
Tribunals, or even the Algiers Declaration of
the Rights of Peoples. Such groups do not
speak for the peoples of the world any more
than most governments do. States exist to create and apply laws. Groups that claim to do so
are appropriating the attributes of states, and
like states gain legitimacy only to the extent
that they properly reflect the deliberate consensus of the peoples of the world, or the region they presume to speak for.
Civil society, properly understood, is a precondition of national statehood, just as statehood is a precondition of civil society. Nations
cannot fully express their deliberate consensus
without the structures of a state. Justice and the
common good cannot emerge outside the
shared purpose of national institutions. Without guarantees of participation, free speech,
and political checks and balances, "peoples"
cannot enjoy the "self-determination" guaranteed by Article 1 of the Human Rights Covenants. "Peoples" only fully exist, and exercise
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I would like to be clear about the sort of civil
society that I am endorsing with this argument. It is a republican society. By "republican" I mean a society committed to the
common good, as discovered through public
deliberation, under popular sovereignty structured to prevent domination by any single
section of society. (See M. Sellers, American
Republicanism, Macmillan and NYU Press,
1994). The republican test of political legitimacy is service to the res publica, or common
good of the people. (See also, Sellers "Republican Liberty" in Gabriel Moens and Suri
Ratnapala (eds.), The Jurisprudence of Liberty,
Butterworths, 1996). Immanuel Kant endorsed
a federation of such republics as the best basis
for a just law of nations. (Kant, Zum ewigen
Frieden, Knigsberg, 1796).
The republican argument for popular sovereignty runs as follows. People have different
talents and life plans with differing perceptions of the common good. Private interests
color human attitudes. Decent humility requires that citizens defer to a reasonable system for resolving conflicting perceptions of
justice. Republicanism proposes that everyone
is capable of perceiving moral truths. This
makes popular sovereignty the best source of
justice. If justice and the common good exist
and all people have the capacity to perceive
them, then the best route to a just society will
be through public deliberation. To exclude any
voices from the public debate would deprive
society of their insights, and subject some pri:vate interests to the domination of others. (See
Sellers, Republican Impartiality, in 11 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 273, 1991.)
Republicanism proposes a technique for
creating and enforcing laws generally, including the laws of humanity. The persons affected, properly constituted into a civil society,
become a "people" for the purposes of the
relevant legislation, creating their own com-
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mon good and common sense of justice. When
popular sovereignty does not prevail, voices
are excluded, the population cannot exercise
its deliberative function, and the "people" no
longer exist for the purposes of legislation.
"Res publicares estpopuli", as Cicero first put it.
The lessons of the French and American revolutions demonstrate that for the purposes of
republican government "the people" must embrace all permanent inhabitants of the territory
in question.
VI. Peoples
"Peoples" in customary international law
are the citizens of existing states - no more,
and no less. The history of decolonization, the
Human Rights Covenants, and usage going
back to Cicero demonstrate that the "populus"
embraces all citizens. Modern republicanism
and fundamental justice insist that the citizens
should include all permanent residents of the
state. So it is nonsense to maintain (as some
self-styled "postmodern" scholars now do)
that the Covenants' endorsement of self-determination for all "peoples" has "exploded once
and for all" the notion of the nation-state. Such
statements imply a confusion of "peoples",
"minorities" and "nations". Stable peoples
will evolve into nations. But not all minorities
are peoples (or nations).
The driving force exploding the "modern"
interstate system owes less to the definition of
a "people" (which has not changed) than to the
concept of "self-determination". What is it for
a people to enjoy its "right" to self-determination, or "freely" to determine its "political status" or "economic, social and cultural
development" pursuant to United Nations
Covenants? Plain English, and the history of
the concept of self-determination going back to
past Woodrow Wilson to the American and
other modern revolutions imply republican
popular sovereignty, with all the rights to fair
procedure and universal suffrage that entails.
To deny any segment or minority of the population basic rights and a voice in public affairs
denies the people of that state their self-deter-
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mination, in violation of accepted international law.
Self-determination has long been recognized to embrace both "internal" and "external" popular sovereignty. (See e.g. Antonio
Cassese, PoliticalSelf-Determination- Old concepts andNew Developments in Cassese (ed.), UN
Law/FundamentalRights: Two Topics in International Law, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1979.) It requires that the people be free both of external
interference and internal usurpation of government. Contemporary advocates of "democratically constituted geogovernance" (the
phrase is Richard Falk's) would do well to
recognize the most democratic of all systems
-democracy, as a useful vehicle for providing
a "government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory without distinction
as to race, creed or color", pursuant to the
United Nations General Assembly's 1970
"Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance With
the Charter of the United Nations".
VII. Nations
Nations were essential to the law of nations,
and public international law. But both categories (and particularly the latter) rested on a
false equivalence between nations and states.
The proposed new "law of humanity" would
avoid this mistake, at the cost of disregarding
nations altogether. Instead "postmodern" lawyers would frankly rely on the United Nations
General Assembly, or on Nobel Peace Prize
winners, or the International Court of Justice,
or the media, or on other undemocratic or
non-democratic forces in the best position to
resist globalizing initiatives such as GATT and
NAFTA. But why resist globalization if not in
aid of local autonomy and national independence? The phrase "law of humanity" implies
universal values and a world republic. The
rhetoric of its advocates implies local interests
and national particularity.
Both are desirable. Universal human rights
provide the basic framework for local self-de-
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termination, and self-determination leads to
local self-expression. Differences in climates,
cultures, customs and history divide humanity
into natural units. War, poverty and pestilence
may force migrations and social discontinuity.
But stable societies develop national attributes
from the cultural capital of their constituent
minorities. Stable states become nations. A
world nation or world republic would not be
desirable even if it were possible because people properly savor the particularity of local
circumstance. Nations benefit from the models
they provide each other. World government
would risk universal tyranny through the single usurpation of an ambitious despot or selfimportant Caesar. National independence
protects reservoirs of justice when the rest of
the world becomes foolish or unlucky.
States properly follow the boundaries of
existing nations. So should nations grow out of
existing states. Every people is a prospective
nation. Given republican government each
people will become a nation. But in the absence
of self-determination, minorities suffer, or majorities suffer, and secession may provide the
best basis for developing the sense of justice
and pursuit of the common good that leads to
national identity and stable social institutions.
As the United Nations General Assembly's
1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations
strongly and correctly implies, the right to
"territorial integrity" and "political unity" of
"sovereign and independent states" depends
on the representative nature of their governments, and absence of discrimination on the
basis of race, creed, or color.
Conclusion
To speak of the "law of humanity" rather
than the "law of nations" would be a mistake,
because it understates the proper role of nations in human well-being. Speaking of "nations" rather than "states" usefully
distinguishes "international" from "interstate" law. The law of nations is the law of
humanity, discovered through the mediation
of nations, or rather of peoples, treated as naASIL
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tions, even before they become so. The socalled "law of humanity" is not "post-modern" but pre-modern, harking back to when
the Roman praetor's edict settled legal relations for all the Mediterranean world. The European Reformation put an end to such
pretensions of universal authority. Worldwide "civil society" does not exist, should not
exist, and has not existed since Alaric sacked
Rome. The Secretary-General and United Nations General Assembly do not provide deserving replacements.
Let me repeat my argument. Natural law
was the basis of the old "law of nations". The
United Nations confirmed the preeminence of
the new "international" law. But both recognized the central importance of fundamental
human rights. Civil society develops within
nations, not between them. Every state should
be a republic. This would make its people a
nation, and self-determining nations still provide the best foundation for public international law. Self-appointed "Watch" groups,
"People's" tribunals, and scholarly gatherings
may pontificate about the law of humanity.
But they cannot discover it without the mediation of self-governing national republics,
based on human rights, popular sovereignty,
and respect for the rule of law.
Mortimer Sellers
University of Baltimore
School of Law

Some Reflections on the Law of
Humanity
Had he his way, Richard Falk would reground international law on a principle of justice for the least. Now, according to Richard
Falk, his way is history's way-and history
inevitably has its way. But Falk's vision of
universal justice is so grand that it is often
difficult to make out the details in what he sees.
Falk does not explain how the poor can arrive
at effective representation in international
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